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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

NO. 42205

)

V.

)
)

KRISTI L. HURLES,

)

ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2010-17155

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
ON REVIEW

____________ )
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This Court granted the State's Petition for Review which relates to the Idaho
Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Hurles, Docket Number 39219, 2013 Opinion No.
3 (Jan. 17, 2014) ("Opinion"). While the appeal in this matter was timely from the district
court's judgment of conviction, the issues on appeal primarily relate to the restitution
order accompanying the judgment of conviction.
Kristie L. Hurles was employed at a bar and was charged with two counts of
grand theft.

One of the counts alleged that she embezzled proceeds from the bar's
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lottery pull-tab game, and the other charge alleged that she embezzled money from the
bar's ATM machine.

Ms. Hurles' pleaded guilty to embezzling funds from the ATM

machine and the State dismissed the charge related to the lottery pull-tab game. The
amount of restitution in this matter became a hotly contested issued in this matter, and
Ms. Hurles was ultimelty ordered to pay approximately $204,000.

On appeal,

Ms. Hurles made various challenges to the district court's restitution order.
In the Opinion, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals held that the owners
of the bar, Jody and Butch Morrison, who were also the holders of the accountant-client
privilege, implicitly waived that privilege when they had their accountant cooperate with
law enforcement while police were investigating Ms. Hurles' embezzlement. (Opinion,
pp.5-8.)

In the State's brief in support of its petition for review (hereinafter,

Respondent's Brief on Review), it argued that there was no implicit waiver of the
accountant-client privilege because the prosecution did not use any of the accountant's
statements or work product to establish its restitution figure. Ms. Hurles argues that the
Morrisons interjected their accountant's work product and communications into this
matter when they had him cooperate with police to establish how much money was
being embezzled.

Ms. Hurles also argues that the waiver of the accountant-client

privilege is broad and extends to all of the accountant's work product and
communications regarding his investigation into Ms. Hurles' embezzlement.
The Court of Appeals also reversed the restitution award because the district
court awarded restitution for uncharged conduct, which was not contemplated in the
plea agreement. (Opinion, pp.9-13.) The State disagrees with this holding and argues
that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for uncharged conduct when the
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State mentioned at the change of plea hearing that it was going to "seek" restitution on
all the "DRs" disclosed during discovery. Ms. Hurles argues that the reference to the
"DRs" was clarified by the prosecutor at the end of the change of plea hearing when she
said that Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for a dismissed charge. Ms. Hurles also
argues that the term "DRs" is at best ambiguous and, due to that ambiguity, the plea
agreement should be interpreted in Ms. Hurles' favor.
The Court of Appeals also reversed the restitution award as to some civil
attorneys' fees which were brought by the Morrisons against various parties which had
a tangential relationship to Ms. Hurles' criminal case. (Opinion, pp.13-15.) However, it
also held that it was appropriate to award attorneys' fees for the Morrisons' intervention
into Ms. Hurles' bankruptcy because it was the only way to prevent the criminal
restitution award from being discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings.

(Opinion,

pp.15-16.) Ms. Hurles argues that under federal bankruptcy law, criminal restitution is
automatically excepted from discharge in bankruptcy.

Since the restitution was not

dischargeable in the bankruptcy proceedings, the intervention was not necessary to
protect the criminal restitution and, therefore, attorneys' fees for the intervention into the
bankruptcy are not awardable as restitution.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Ms. Hurles was employed by Jody and Butch Morrison at the Crescent "No
Lawyers Bar" and Grill (hereinafter, No Lawyers Bar), and was responsible for the
business' bookkeeping. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 4.)
In 2010, the Morrisons noticed that they were losing money from the proceeds of a
lottery pull tab game. (PSI, p.2.) The Idaho Lottery helped the Morrisons investigate
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the cause of their losses and determined that Ms. Hurles was stealing a portion of the
lottery proceeds. (PSI, p.2.) A representative of the Idaho State Lottery later testified
that the amount of money Ms. Hurles stole from the lottery pull tab proceeds was
approxirnately$10,000. 1 (05/19/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-16, p.18, Ls.9-18.)
As a result of that investigation and a subsequent change in the No Lawyers
Bar's bookkeeping procedures, it was determined that Ms. Hurles was also responsible
for stealing money from the Morrisons' petty cash, portions of which were supposed to
be placed in the ATM machine located in the entrance of the No Lawyers Bar. (PSI,
pp.3-4.)
The No Lawyers Bar, as opposed to U.S. Bank, which owned the ATM, provided
the funds for the ATM, and the bank would send the Bar a check with the fees it
collected when a patron of the Bar took money out of the ATM.

(05/19/11 Tr., p.45,

L.19 - p.46, L.25.) The Morrisons had a bookkeeping process whereby money was
taken out of the safe which held petty cash and placed into the ATM.

(05/19/11

Tr., p.40, L.24 - p.42, L.10, p.44, L.4 - p.51, L.25.) The person who took the petty cash
out of the safe would place an IOU in the safe, to keep a record of the amount of money
taken out of the petty cash. (05/19/11 Tr., p.47, Ls.6-14.) To cover the amount of the
IOU, Ms. Morrison would write a check which was drawn from proceeds generated
during the previous day of business. (05/19/11 Tr., p.47, L.25 - p.48, L.5, p.74, L.15 p.75, L.4, p.76, Ls.5-8.) This bookkeeping process was done in order to maintain a
steady balance of money in the petty cash and to track how much money was taken
from the petty cash and placed into the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.48, Ls.6-22.)

1

Ms. Hurles did not challenge this portion of the restitution award on appeal.
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Ms. Hurles was one of two people, other than the Morrisons, who would
replenish the cash in the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.47, Ls.15-18.) However, Ms. Morrison
did not keep a daily log of the IOUs and threw the IOUs away after money taken from
the petty cash was replaced. (05/19/11 Tr., p.65, L.21 - p.66, L.25, p.70, Ls.12-14.)
As a result of an investigation into the ATM machine, Ms. Hurles eventually
admitted that she had stolen funds from the ATM to compensate for the loss of her
husband's job. (PSI, pp.3-4.)

In order to accomplish the theft, Ms. Hurles would steal

money by cashing a check and then placing only a portion of the proceeds into the
ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.)
Ms. Hurles was charged, by Information, with two counts of grand theft.
(R., pp.28-29.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Hurles pleaded guilty to one count of
grand theft which was related to the ATM thefts and, in return, the State dismissed the
remaining count which related to the thefts from the lottery proceeds. (02/17/11 Tr., p.1,
L.19- p.3, L.14; R., pp.33-34.)
At the change of plea hearing, the State said that it was going to "seek restitution
on all DRs that were disclosed in discovery." (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, Ls.19-22.) Ms. Hurles
then admitted that she stole funds from the ATM for a period of one year, which began
in December of 2008 and ended in December of 2009. (02/17/11 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7,
L.3.) After the district court accepted Ms. Hurles' guilty plea, the State clarified that the
parties agreed that Ms. Hurles would pay restitution for the dismissed count related to
the thefts from the lottery proceeds. (02/17/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-19.)
The amount of restitution Ms. Hurles owed the Morrisons became a highly
contested issue in this case. Ms. Hurles estimated that the amount of money she stole
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from the ATM was approximately $20,000, while the Morrisons' former accountant,
Mr. Warr, conducted an accounting and initially concluded the amount she stole from
the ATM to be approximately $100,000.

(PSI, pp.4, 213-214.)

The Morrisons'

restitution estimates for the ATM thefts oscillated from $284,000 to $90,000. (05/19/11
Tr., p.79, Ls.20-25.)
In order to calculate that amount of restitution Ms. Hurles embezzled from the
ATM, the Morrisons partially relied on a spreadsheet created by the law firm Givens
Pursley, which the Morrisons hired to litigate civil lawsuits tangentially related to
Ms. Hurles' embezzlement. (05/19/11 Tr., p.24, L.16 - p.25, L.15.) Alison Berriochoa,
a paralegal at Givens Pursley, was given the responsibility of creating the spreadsheet.
(05tl 9/11 Tr., p.24, L.·16 - p.26, L.12.) Ms. Berriochoa partially relied on documents
provided to her by Mr. Warr to create the spreadsheet. (05/19/11 Tr., p.71, L.3 - p.73,
L.19.) Ms. Berriochoa ultimately concluded that Ms. Hurles stole $153,920. (05/19/11
Tr., p.32, Ls.9-17.)
At the restitution hearing, Ms. Berriochoa testified that the $153,920 figure was
based on the total amount of the checks, but that total did not take into account the fact
that Ms. Hurles deposited between eighty to ninety percent of the checks' proceeds into
the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-18.) Ms. Berriochoa also testified that many of the
checks were accidentally categorized as ones Ms. Hurles cashed when, in reality, they
were endorsed by the Morrisons and, therefore, were probably cashed by the
Morrisons. (05/19/11 Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.36, L.14.) Ms. Morrison also testified that the
at least some of the checks Ms. Berriochoa accidentally accredited to Ms. Hurles'
restitution total were in fact cashed by the Morrisons. (05/19/11 Tr., p.50, L.18 - p.51,
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L.20.)

Ms. Morrison also testified that two people with initials W.B. and D.S. also

endorsed checks, but she does not know of any employees who had those initials.
(05/19/11 Tr., p.60, L.12 - p.61, L.14.)
At the end of the restitution hearing, defense counsel stated that "what
Ms. Hurles is telling me -- and it makes practical sense ... [s)he would cash [a] check,
but bring back ... $900 of $1,000 ... " and place the $900 into the ATM. (05/19/11
Tr., p.86, L.19 - p.87, L.3.) Defense counsel asserted, in the form of a question to
Ms. Morrison, that the Morrisons' restitution figure was based on the entire amount of
the checks and did not take into account that Ms. Hurles was only taking ten to twenty
percent of the proceeds of the cashed checks. (05/'19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-21.) When
Ms. Morrison was asked how she proved the actual amount of money Ms. Hurles took
from the ATM, she stated that she relied on Mr. Warr's documents and calculations.
(05/19/11 Tr., p.71, L.21 - p.73, L.10.) Defense counsel also asked Ms. Morrison if she
ever "told your accountant at time that you and [Mr. Morrison] were taking money from
this ATM account through the same method" as Ms. Hurles. (05/19/11 Tr., p.75, Ls.1215.)

Ms. Morrison denied that allegation.

(05/19/11 Tr., p.75, Ls.20-23.) Defense

counsel then stated he wanted to call Mr. Warr to testify and made an offer of proof that
Mr. Warr would testify that the Morrisons could not even establish that Ms. Hurles stole
$90,000. (05/19/11 Tr., p.79, Ls.20-25.) Trial counsel also stated that he looked over
the spreadsheet with Mr. Warr and they both noticed that "a lot of the information" in the
spreadsheet was "incorrect." (05/19/11 Tr., p.80, L.23 - p.81, L.2.)
Due to time constraints, the restitution hearing was continued and Mr. Warr did
not testify. (05/19/11 Tr., p.80, L.1 - p.81, L.4, p.90, Ls.4-14.) The district court stated
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that the State should provide what additional information was necessary to defense
counsel or "[w]hat ever you think you need to make sure your client has had a fair ability
to show the amount of restitution that's due and owing."

(05/19/11 Tr., p.89, L.23 -

p.90, L.12.)
At the second restitution hearing, Mr. Warr was sworn in and began to testify.
(08/04/11 Tr., p.10, L.13- p.12, L.3.) When asked the first question pertaining to the
restitution issue, the State invoked the accountant-client privilege on behalf of the
Morrisons. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, Ls.4-12.) Defense counsel implicitly stated he needed
the testimony from Mr. Warr because the Morrisons' restitution estimate was unreliable,
as it kept changing and had ranged from $400,000 to $100,000. 2 (08/04/1'1 Tr., p.15,
Ls.15-17.)

The State then argued that Mr. Warr already provided his restitution

calculations during the presentence investigation and he established that Ms. Hurles
stole $100,000. (08/04/11 Tr., p.16, L.14 - p.17, L.11.) It further argued that Mr. Warr's
reports were already in the record and could be relied on by the court, but the Morrisons
could prevent him from testifying about those reports because they controlled the
accountant-client privilege.

(08/04/11 Tr., p.16, L.14 - p.17, L.11.) Defense counsel

argued that the Morrisons implicitly waived the privilege because they used the
documents created by Mr. Warr for the presentence investigation to establish the
amount of restitution. (08/04/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16.) Defense counsel also asserted
that he needed Mr. Warr to testify in order to impeach Ms. Morrison with admissions she

2

The amount of restitution being sought changed again at that hearing as the State
noted that it had come up with $6,600 in additional corrections. (08/04/11 Tr., p.16,
Ls.14-18.)
8

made to Mr. Warr. (08/04/1 '1 Tr., p.21, L.24 - p.22, L.13.) The district court excused
Mr. Warr from testifying entirely. (08/04/11 Tr., p.15, L.25- p.16, L.1.)
At a consolidated restitution/sentencing hearing, the district court began by
noting that the victims were asking for $240,174 in restitution.
Ls.15-17.)

(08/11/11 Tr., p.95,

The issue of the accountant-client privilege was addressed and defense

counsel argued that Ms. Morrison waived the privilege by discussing conversations she
had with her accountant at the first restitution hearing. (08/11/11 Tr., p.96, L.5 - p.97,
L.22.) Defense counsel also argued that the privilege was waived because Mr. Warr
was the State's witness and it was the State which told defense counsel to speak with
Mr. Warr about the amount of restitution Ms. Hurles owed the Morrisons.

(08/11/11

Tr., p.99, Ls.5-25.) The State also pointed out that Ms. Hurles' husband alleged in the
PSI that the Morrisons lied to the district court about the amount of restitution in order to
get revenge against Ms. Hurles.

(08/11/11 Tr., p.109, Ls.13-16.)

Ms. Hurles was

ultimately order to pay approximately 155,000 for the embezzlement from the ATM and
the lottery pull-tab game. (R., pp.71-72.)
As mentioned above, the Morrisons had also hired the firm Givens Pursley to
litigate issues tangentially associated with the criminal case. (05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.510.)

Those lawsuits were against Mr. Warr, Mr. Warr's firm, and U.S. Bank, and

included an intervention into Ms. Hurles' bankruptcy case. 3 (08/11/11 Tr., p.118, Ls.1824; PSI, p.52; Opinion, p.13.) The district court ruled that Ms. Hurles would have to pay
the attorneys' fees for all of this litigation. (05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.11-17.) Ms. Hurles

Defense counsel erroneously stated that the lawsuit was against Bank of America, as
opposed to U.S. Bank. (PSI, p.52.)
3
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objected to the inclusion of the attorneys' fees in the criminal restitution award.
(05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.18-·19.) At the second restitution hearing, the State requested
$48,734.61 in civil attorneys' fees, all of which were awarded by the district court.
(08/04/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-24; 08/11/11 Tr., p.132, Ls.4-6, p.135, Ls.17-25; R, pp.67-72.)
The district court ordered Ms. Hurles to pay approximately $204,000 in restitution which
included both the embezzlement restitution and the attorneys' fees. (R., pp.71-72.) The
district court also imposed a unified sentence of 14 years, with two years fixed.
(R., pp.67-68.) Ms. Hurles timely appealed. (R., pp.73-76.)
On appeal, Ms. Hurles argued that the Morrisons implicitly waived the
accountant-client privilege when they had Mr. Warr participate in the police investigation
and when the State, through Ms. Morrison, partially relied on his calculations and
communications to establish their restitution calculation.

She also argued that the

restitution award was not supported by substantial and competent evidence because
the spreadsheet created by Ms. Berriochoa did not take into consideration the
uncontested fact that Ms. Hurles only stole a small percentage of the proceeds of each
cashed check. As a subcomponent of the foregoing argument, Ms. Hurles argued that
the restitution award was not supported by substantial and competent evidence
because it included restitution for uncharged conduct. Ms. Hurles also argued that civil
attorneys' fees are not awardable as criminal restitution.
The Court of Appeals agreed with some of Ms. Hurles' claims of error and
reversed the district court on the privilege issue, remanding this case with instructions to
have Mr. Warr testify as to his involvement in the police investigation.

The Court of

Appeals also held that the restitution award was not supported by substantial and
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competent evidence because there was no causal relationship between Ms. Hurles'
thefts from December 2008 to December 2009 and the uncharged conduct which

allegedly occurred from 2005 to November of 2008.

The Court of Appeals also

reversed the restitution award as to a portion of the civil attorneys' fees. The State then

filed a petition for review which was granted by this Court.
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1.

the district court err when it concluded that the Morrisons did not implicitly
the accountant-client privilege?
Was the district court's restitution calculation supported by substantial and
competent evidence?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it included civil attorneys' fees as
part of the restitution awarded in the criminal proceedings?

12

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Morrisons Did Not Implicitly
Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege
Introduction
The Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege as to Mr. Warr's
involvement with the calculation of restitution because they did nothing in this matter to
protect their accountant-client privilege until Mr. Warr was called to testify on
Hurles' behalf at the second restitution hearing. Prior to that hearing, the Morrisons
had their accountant collaborate with police; the State subpoenaed Mr. Warr to testify at
the original restitution hearing; trial counsel was asked to meet with Mr. Warr to discuss
the restitution issues, which he did. At the first restitution hearing, Ms. Morrison relied
on Mr. Warr's word product and she disclosed the contents of her conversations with
Mr. Warr.

The Morrisons also sued Mr. Warr.

As such, the Morrisons waived their

accountant-client privilege because their actions were not consistent with the actions of
a party protecting a privilege.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Morrisons Did Not Implicitly
Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege

1.

Ms. Hurles Did Not Abandon Her Claim As To the Privilege Issue By Her
Decision To Forgo Filing A Motion To Reconsider The District Court's
Ruling On The Privilege Issue

As a preliminary matter, the State argues that Ms. Hurles waived any appellate
claims she has in regard to the implicit waiver of the account-client privilege because
Ms. Hurles never provided the district court an opportunity to make an adverse ruling as
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to that issue.

(Respondent's Brief On Review, pp.20-23.)

Contrary to the State's

assertion, Ms. Hurles did not abandon her claim of error related to the accountant-client
privilege issue.
At the second restitution hearing, Ms. Hurles called the Morrisons' accountant,
Mr. Warr, to testify and the Morrisons invoked the accountant-client privilege. (08/04/'11
Tr., p.10, L.13 - p.12, L.12.) After hearing a brief argument, the district court ruled that
the Morrisons appropriately invoked the accountant-client privilege and excused
Mr. Warr from testifying.

(08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.16, L.1.)

At the final

restitution/sentencing hearing, trial counsel proffered additional reasons why the court
should revisit its prior ruling about the applicability of the accountant-client privilege.
(08/11/11 Tr., p.96, L.5 - p.98, L.7.) The district court then stated that it was going to
"order the restitution that's been provided to me at this point" and that it was willing to
revisit the privilege issue in the event trial counsel filed a "motion to reconsider."
(08/11/11 Tr., p.98, L.9 - p.99, L.1.) The district court then awarded the Morrisons all of
the restitution requested by the State.

(08/11/11 Tr., p.103, Ls.9-12.) Trial counsel

never filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's accountant-client privilege ruling.
Based on the foregoing facts, the State argues that Ms. Hurles abandoned her
ability to raise an appellate challenge as to the district court's ruling on the privilege
issue because Ms. Hurles never filed a motion to reconsider the district court's prior
ruling. (Respondent's Brief On Review, pp.20-23.) In support of this position, the State
cites to State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378 (1999).

In that case, the defendant filed a

suppression motion but never followed up on it, and the district court never ruled on the
motion. Id. at 384.

This Court refused to address the suppression issue on appeal
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because an appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on appeal unless
the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of
error."' Id. (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481,485 (1993)).
The Barnes case is inapposite, as there were multiple rulings on the privilege
issue in this matter. The first ruling occurred at the second restitution hearing, where
the accountant-client privilege was invoked, the district court found a privilege existed,
and the district court excused Mr. Warr from testifying. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.4 - p.16,
L.1.)

The second ruling on the issue occurred when the district court imposed the full

amount of restitution at the restitution/sentencing hearing. (08/11/11 Tr., p.103, Ls.9-12;
R., pp.71-72.) While the State argues that Ms. Hurles abandoned her claim, that is not
accurate, as the district court ruled on the privilege issue and imposed all of the
restitution requested by the State. The district court's invitation for Ms. Hurles to file a
motion for reconsideration of its prior ruling on the accountant-client privilege issue does
not mean, as the State asserts, that the district court failed to rule on the privilege issue.
Concerning the same issue, the State also argues that the district court did not
rule on the new arguments proffered by trial counsel at the final restitution/sentencing
hearing because trial counsel based some of those arguments on his memory of the
original restitution hearing and the district court requested that Ms. Hurles provide it with
a transcript of that hearing. (Respondent's Brief On Review, pp.20-21.) This argument
suffers from the same infirmities as the prior argument. Just because the district court
invited trial counsel to provide more information to support an argument does not
change the fact that the district court ruled against Ms. Hurles as to the arguments she
advanced at the final restitution/sentencing hearing.
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In sum, the accountant-client waiver issue was preserved for appeal when the
district court held that a privilege existed and excused Mr. Warr from testifying. The
new arguments made by trial counsel at the final restitution/sentencing hearing were
likewise preserved for appeal when the district court ordered the full amount of
restitution requested by the State without providing Ms. Hurles an opportunity to have
Mr. Warr testify.

2.

The District Court Erred When It Ruled That The Morrisons Did Not
Implicitly Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege

The Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege because they put
actually Mr. Warr's analysis at issue and did nothing in this matter to protect their
privilege until Mr. Warr was called to testify on Ms. Hurles' behalf at the second
restitution hearing.

Ms. Hurles argues that the waiver in this matter was broad and

relates to all of Mr. Warr's work product and communications regarding the amount of
money Ms. Hurles embezzled from the No Lawyers Bar. In the event Mr. Warr learned
during his investigation into Ms. Hurles' embezzlement, that people other than
Ms. Hurles were taking money from the ATM, the waiver in this case was broad enough
to include that subject matter.
The accountant-client privilege is set forth in Idaho Rule of Evidence 515 and
Idaho Code Section 9-203A.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 510 sets forth circumstances

under which a privilege is implicitly waived, which follows:
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person
or the person's predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily
discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or
communication. This rule does not apply if the disclosure is itself a
privileged communication.
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,
llf

I.R.E. 510. 4 An implicit waiver of any privilege exists when the holder of a privilege
voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of "any significant part of the matter
or communication."

I.R.E. 510.

This Rule provides for a broad waiver, which

encompasses the entire subject matter relating to the waiver, not just the specific
information disclosed.
While not directly dealing with I.R.E. 510, this Court has provided further
guidance over the implicit waiver of a privilege. In Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417,
418 ( 1977), the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants seeking specific
performance of certain settlement agreements. When the settlement agreements were
first executed, the defendants were initially satisfied with them. Id. However, one of the
defendants, Louise Spencer, changed her mind and refused to perform her contractual
obligations. Id. The plaintiffs then sued Ms. Spencer for specific performance of the
settlement agreements.

Id.

As part of her defense, Ms. Spencer filed an affidavit

wherein she asserted that the settlement agreement was the result of fraud and duress
perpetrated by, among other people, her former attorneys, who represented her during
the settlement agreement negotiations. Id. At trial, and over Ms. Spencer's invocation
of the attorney-client privilege, her former attorneys testified as to the content of their

While not raised below, it appears that the I.RE. 515 actually provides an express
exception to the accountant-client privilege under circumstances where the client, the
holder of the privilege, provides his/her accountant with false information. According to
I.RE. 515(d) there "is no privilege under this rule," as "to a communication relevant to
an issue of breach of duty by the accountant to the client or by the client to the
accountant." I.RE 515(d)(3) (emphasis added). In the event this case is remanded for
another restitution hearing, this exception to the accountant-client privilege will enable
Mr. Warr to testify as to any communications he had with the Morrisons pertaining to the
issue of whether they provided him false information during his investigation into
Ms. Hurles embezzlement.
4
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conversations with Ms. Spencer. Id. at 418-419. The trial court ultimately concluded
that the former attorneys did not engage in fraud or duress during those conversations.

Id. Ms. Spencer appealed. Id.
On appeal, Ms. Spencer's primary argument was that the district court erred
when it concluded that she implicitly waived her attorney-client privilege.

Id. at 419.

While interpreting the applicable statue, I.C § 9-203, the Idaho Supreme Court first
reasoned that consent under the statue could be either express or implied, and when
consent is found, the privilege is waived. Id. The Supreme Court then held as follows:
This Court has also recognized that the attorney-client privilege is a
defensive shield and not an offensive sword. Here, in support of her
defense to the action for specific performance, Mrs. Spencer "testified" both
to her communications with her attorneys throughout the settlement
process and to the nature of their relation with her while discharging their
duties as her attorneys. Having attacked the settlement agreements by this
evidence, appellants then sought to prevent respondents from asking
certain questions of appellant Louise Spencer's former attorneys, who were
the other participants to the conversations so exposed and whose
reputation and professional integrity were impugned.
In these circumstances, appellant Louise Spencer's testimony
impliedly consented to the disclosure of information she was otherwise
privileged to withhold. Fairness requires that what she had disclosed could
not later be withheld. Moreover, having herself disclosed communications
and conduct otherwise privileged from disclosure, the rationale behind the
privilege would no longer be served by recognizing appellant Louise
Spencer's efforts to invoke it as a bar to the testimony of her former
attorneys.

By testifying to privileged communications, and by making an issue of her
defense the privileged matter of her relation with her former attorneys,
appellant Louise Spencer waived the attorney-client privilege for all
communications relevant to the settlement process and the conduct of her
former attorneys.

Id. at 420-421 (citation omitted).
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In this case, the Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege by
injecting his work into this case and by relying on Mr. Warr's documents to calculate the
amount of restitution.

At the second restitution hearing, defense counsel made the

following objection to Ms. Morrison's invocation of the accountant-client privilege, "here
is my problem.

They're going to use Mr. Warr's documents for the presentence

investigation, they can't claim privilege and turn around and say, okay, he can't testify
as to what those documents are." (08/04/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16.) Defense counsel also
objected on the basis that Ms. Morrisons' decision to discuss the contents of Mr. Warr's
work product constitutes a waiver. (08/11/11 Tr., p.97, Ls.14-16.)
The Morrisons' reliance on Mr. Warr's work product during the presentence
process also waived the accountant-client privilege.

The presentence investigator

stated that the Morrisons did not keep a log of the amount of money that went into the
ATM "but they had their accountant come up with an amount of loss from the ATM."
(PSI, p.3.)

Ms. Morrison told the presentence investigator that "[b]ased on further

investigation, her confession and in depth accounting we had proof [that Ms. Hurles
stole money from the ATM]." (PSI, p.5 (emphasis added).)
At the first restitution hearing, before the accountant-client privilege was invoked,
Ms. Morrison partially relied on Mr. Warr's work product to establish her restitution
calculation. When asked how she calculated the amount of money Ms. Hurles stole,
Ms. Morrison replied as follows:
I have records from my then accountant, James Warr, who showed
an imbalance in the credits and the debits of the ATM of checks written to
the ATM; credits meaning the money that was dispensed and paid back to
my bank account from the ATM company. And those differences are what
you see in column 4, I believe it is, a total of 154-some-thousand-dollars.

19

I don't know if I am in the right column. But those differences
between what he tracked as being what was supposed to be money in and
money out is $139,000, I think it is.
Q [Defense Counsel].
Okay. Just for our purposes, what am I
talking about here is what he tracked to you is that the ATM figures were
inflated?

A [Ms. Morrison].

Correct. They were not correct.

Q [Defense Counsel].
You say that you have got records to
show where the cash went once it was cashed at the bank; is that right?

A [Ms. Morrison].
I have accounting records from my accountant
that show that the checks that were written to - supposed to be deposited
into the ATM are short- are short by about $139,000.
(05/19/11 Tr., p.71, L.21 - p.73, L.10.)

\/\/hen asked about her records of cash

transactions she stated "I have records of them. I have - we have daily cash recordings
that we do every day.

We have a monthly spreadsheet that is provided to my

accountant." (05/19/11 Tr., p.77, L.23 - p.78, L.1.)
Even after invoking the accountant-client privilege, the State still relied on
Mr. Warr's work product:
And again, Your Honor, the figures that Mr. Warr did give that were
reflected in the police reports, have already been provided in the form of
the presentence investigation, and so part of the invocation there, that's
their privilege, that's their right to invoke it, but from the state's perspective,
his view that there was a theft, and the fact that it was over $100,000 is
already documented in the police reports, and so I think we can go forward,
from the state's view, with that as background that has already been
provided by that witness and is attached to the presentence report and
that's part of the original police reports.
(08/04/11 Tr., p.16, L.25-p.17, L.11.)
Defense counsel also argued that Ms. Morrison waived the privilege because she
disclosed communications between herself and Mr. Warr. Defense counsel made the
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following objection at the second restitution hearing, "VVhen Ms. Morrison testified, my
recollection is that she had a - she spoke on - in either direct examination or on cross
examination, about conversations she had with her accountant, which I think, waives
the accountant/client privilege."

(08/11/11 Tr., p.96, Ls.5-10.)

During the initial

investigation concerning the ATM, Mr. Warr participated with the Boise Police
Department and explained how the internal bookkeeping operations of the No Lawyers
Bar functioned.

(PSI, p.214.)

During the first restitution hearing, Ms. Morrison also

testified that Mr. Warr told her about a $1,300 accounting discrepancy, and that he had
created new book keeping procedures for the No Lawyers Bar after discovering various
accounting problems and Ms. Hurles' theft. (05/'19/11 Tr., p.62, L.24 - p. 70, L.11.)
Additionally, defense counsel met with Mr. Warr and discussed the amount of
restitution. At the restitution/sentencing hearing defense counsel stated, "Your Honor,
this is a witness given to me by the state, subpoenaed by the State to the original
restitution hearing. No privilege was ever requested." (08/11/11 Tr., p.97, Ls.17-20.)
The following dialogue is from the original restitution hearing:
Q [Defense Counsel].
Okay. And through this process, were you
able to detect this amount of loss?
A [Ms. Morrison].
coming from.

No, because that's not where the amount of loss was

Q [Defense Counsel].
So what I'm saying is, isn't it possible that
Ms. Hurles wasn't cashing all of these checks but, instead, returning a
significant portion back to the bar?
A [Ms. Morrison].
I think that she's already admitted in her PSI that she
would take checks to the bank and cash them, and a portion of that
proceeds would go into the ATM. So I think that's pretty clear.
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Q [Defense Counsel].
today, then, we are just cataloging
single
is
for that full amou
is that

we are doing
and saying

[Defense Counsel]: Well, everyone agrees that she didn't take the full
amount of these checks.
I don't think everyone agrees to that.

THE COURT:

[Defense Counsel]: The problem is - and you're going to hear from the
accountant - is that we just don't have the records to establish that. They
say that. ... [T]his figure has gone from $90 to $284,000 back down to
$160,000. And the amountTHE COURT: Okay. So you're going to call an accountant yet today?

[Defense Counsel]: I apologize for that. I can tell the court, too, that
there [are] a lot of layers to this thing. And as I went and met with Givens
Pursley, as I went and met with the accountant ....
(05/19/11 Tr., p. 78, L.6

p.80, L.16.) The district court initiated the following dialogue

at the second restitution hearing:
Looks to me like the only thing that - that stands between the
restitution figure being requested and the client paying that amount is
potentially whether or not the - you can impeach the victim through the
accountant.
A [Defense Counsel].
Q [The Court].

Correct.

Is that what you want to do?

A [Defense Counsel].

Correct.

Q [The Court].
And I'm just curious; why is it - how did you gain
knowledge that the accountant may have information that would be
impeaching?

A [Defense Counsel].
is the state's witness.

Judge, like I said, Mr. Warr was originally - he
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[The Court].

talk to him?

Did

A [Defense Counsel].
Q [The Court].

he was su

You talked to him?

A [Defense Counsel].

I did talk to him.

Q [The Court].

potentially breached client relationship at that

So

point.
(08/11/11 Tr., p.98, L.22 - p.99, L.17.) The decision to have defense counsel

with Mr. Warr over the amount of restitution and how he calculated that amount
constituted was a continuation of an overall display of behavior inconsistent with a party
protecting a privilege. Moreover,
(08/04/11 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-18.)

Morrisons

Mr. Warr and his accounting firm.

This position is also consistent with I.R.

510 which

states that the holder of a privilege waives the privilege ifs/he "consents to disclosure of
any significant part of the matter or communication." The Morrisons put Mr. Warr's work
product at issue when they had him participate in the police investigation, relied on his
work during the presentence investigation, testified about his work product and
confidential conversations at the original restitution hearing, had defense counsel
contact him to discuss his restitution calculations, and then sued him.
Mr. Warr's testimony is necessary because it is the only means by which the
district court and Ms. Hurles could get an accurate restitution figure.

The Morrisons

indicated that there was no log of the amount of money that went into the ATM each
day, but they had their accountant come up with an amount of loss from the ATM. (PSI,
p.3; 05/19/11 Tr., p.65, L.21 - p.66, L.9; p.70, Ls.12-14.) Since Ms. Hurles was cashing
checks, then returning a portion of the proceeds into the ATM, there is no way of
calculating the restitution without Mr. Warr's testimony.
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Mr. Warr's testimony was also necessary to impeach Ms. Morrison.

Defense

counsel alleged that the Morrisons were taking money from the ATM in the same
manner as Ms. Hurles.

(05/19/11 Tr., p. 75, Ls.12-15.)

The implication is that the

Morrisons were asking for money they took from the ATM to be included in the
restitution award.

However, Ms. Morrison testified that neither she nor her husband

borrowed money from the ATM.
p.75, Ls.20-23.)

(05/19/11 Tr., p.62, Ls.2-23, p.67, L.16 - p.68, L.7,

When Ms. Morrison was asked "Didn't your accountant actually

confront you with the checks signed and endorsed by [Mr. Morrison], and you denied it
for five months," Ms. Morrison answered no.

(05/19/11 Tr., p.69, Ls.22-25.)

When

pressed, Ms. Morrison admitted that she had taken money from the ATM on two
occasions.

(05/'19/11 Tr., p.67, L.16 - p.69, L.21.)

As such, Ms. Hurles needs the

testimony of Mr. Warr to impeach Ms. Morrison over her assertion that the Morrisons
were not taking money out of the ATM.

If defense counsel's allegation is true, then

Ms. Morrison knowingly lied to the court by inflating the amount of money Ms. Hurles
stole from the Morrisons.

According to defense counsel, "even hiring a CPA is not

going to be able to get us

to the admissions made by the alleged victims in this case,

which is really what we needed from Mr. Warr anyway .... " (08/04/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.710.)
On review, the State argues that, even if there was an implicit waiver, that waiver
was limited to Mr. Warr's work product regarding the initial police investigation and does
not extend to communications between Mr. Warr and the Morrisons.

(Respondent's

Brief On Review, p.26.) Ms. Hurles argues that this is an overly narrow view of the
scope of the Morrisons' waiver in this matter. Guidance as to the scope of a waiver of
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can
self-incrimination.

in the

of

5th Amendment privilege

This Court held that once the privilege has been waived

is broad and relates to all matters related to the same subject. This Court's holding
follows:
[A] defendant may not selectively assert his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in order to control what information is before the
court. The general rule regarding waiver of the privilege is that "a witness,
in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the
details." Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321, 119 S.Ct. 1307,
1311-12, 143 L.Ed.2d 424, 433 (1999) (citing Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367, 373, 71 S.Ct. 438, 442, 95 L.Ed. 344, 349 (1951 )).

Thus, when a defendant puts a matter before the sentencing court,
thereby waiving
privilege, the defendant may not then invoke the
privilege as to other matters related to the same subject.

State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, 322 (2012). In this case, the Morrisons had Mr. Warr
do more than just turn over some documents to the police.

Instead, he actually

explained his work product and worked with the police in the initial police investigation.
(PSI, pp.213-214.) As mentioned above, trial counsel asserted that there was a five
month period where Mr. Warr was confronting the Morrisons about checks signed and
endorsed by the Morrisons.

(05/19/11 Tr., p.69, Ls.22-25.)

If Mr. Warr gained

information during the initial police investigation, which led him to believe that the
Morrisons were also taking money from the ATM, then any privilege as to that
information was waived when the Morrisons had Mr. Warr participate in the investigation
of Ms. Hurles' embezzlement, as that is a matter related to the subject of the amount of
money Ms. Hurles embezzled.
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In sum, the Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege as to the
documents and conversations used to establish the amount of restitution Ms. Hurles
owes the Morrisons. This was a broad waiver which relates to all of the information and
communications Mr. Warr had in regard to the investigation into Ms. Hurles'
embezzlement. This is important because there is a possibility that defense counsel's
assertions are correct, which means that the current amount of restitution was
intentionally inflated by the Morrisons and Mr. V\/arr's testimony is the best means to
establish an accurate restitution award.

As such, the district court erred when it

determined that the Morrisons did not waive the accountant-client privilege and, in doing
so, it might have enabled the Morrisons to get away with perjury.

11.
The District Court's Restitution Calculation Was Not Supported By Substantial And
Competent Evidence
A.

Introduction
Mr. Warr, a certified public accountant, performed a professional accounting of

the Morrisons' losses and concluded that the Morrisons were missing approximately
$100,000. 5 (PSI, pp.3, 213-214.) Mr. Warr told the police that there were no daily logs
recording the amount of money that was deposited into the ATM. (PSI, pp.213-214.)
Due to this poor record keeping, Mr. Warr determined the amount of losses by
comparing the deposits U.S. Bank received from the ATM with an internal log of
deposits recorded by the ATM. (PSI, pp.213-214.)

5

It is not clear from the record whether Mr. Warr's $100,000 figure was entirely
attributable to Ms. Hurles' thefts or whether this figure includes funds taken from the
ATM by the Morrisons and/or other third parties. As such, Ms. Hurles is not conceding
that she is responsible for a $100,000 restitution award.

26

However, instead of relying on this professional accounting as the basis for the
restitution award, the Morrisons decided to hire a law firm, Givens Pursley, which had a
paralegal with no accounting background (05/19/'11 Tr., p.36, Ls.17-19) and little
familiarity with the Morrisons' bookkeeping procedures (05/19/11Tr., p.36, Ls.20-25)
add up a list of checks to determine the amount of the loss. (05/19/11 Tr., p.24, L.16 p.36, L.25.)

According to the paralegal, Ms. Hurles' embezzled $153,920. (05/19/11

Tr., p.32, Ls.15-17.)
At the first restitution hearing, defense counsel established various problems with
the spreadsheet created by Givens Pursley. Many of the checks should not have been
attributed to Ms. Hurles embezzlement, as they were endorsed by the Morrisons, W.B.,
and D.B. Additionally, the spreadsheet included the total amount of the cashed checks,
and did not consider the fact that Ms. Hurles was only keeping between ten and twenty
percent of the checks.

Accordingly, the Morrisons' restitution figure was inflated by

money Ms. Hurles never stole.
Additionally, Ms. Hurles was ordered to pay restitution for alleged thefts which
occurred prior to those for which she pleaded guilty. Ms. Hurles was charged with thefts
that occurred between December of 2008 and December of 2009, and Ms. Hurles
pleaded guilty to thefts which occurred during the same period of time.
Ms. Hurles' restitution order includes the losses which began in 2005.

However,
Ms. Hurles

argues that she was not charged with, and did not plead guilty to, any thefts between
2005 and November of 2008. As such, the restitution should not have included losses
for any events which allegedly occurred between 2005 and November of 2008, as those
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alleged losses are not causally related to the criminal acts for which Ms. Hurles was
convicted.

8.

The District Court's Restitution Calculation Was Not Supported By Substantial
And Competent Evidence

1.

The Restitution Award Included The Full Amount Of The Checks
Ms. Hurles Cashed, Even Though She Only Took Ten To Twenty Percent
Of The Cashed Checks

The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the
discretion of a district court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 195304(7) and by the policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer
economic loss. State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822 (Ct App. 2010). In reviewing the
trial court's exercise of discretion, this Court must determine whether the trial court: (1)
correctly perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 378 (Ct. App. 2004). The trial court is directed
by statute to base the amount of economic loss to be awarded upon the preponderance
of evidence submitted to the trial court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or
presentence investigator. Lombard, 149 Idaho at 822 (citing I.C. § 19-5304(6) ). The
determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the trial court whose
findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Id. The State has
the burden of proving the amount of restitution. State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 497498 (Ct. App. 2012).
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In determining the amount of a restitution award, the trial court, "shall consider
the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the
financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors
as the court deems appropriate." Lombard, 149 Idaho at 822-823 (quoting I.C. § 195304(7)). "Restitution may only be awarded for actual economic loss suffered by the
victim." Id. at 823 (citing I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a)(2)).
At the original restitution hearing the victims conceded that Ms. Hurles only stole
a small percentage of the proceeds of the cashed checks.

Ms. Hurles provided the

following explanation of her criminal actions in the PSI:
Ms. Hurles admitted that she had taken money from the ATM. She
supported that she did this by cashing petty cash checks that were
supposed to be used to fill the ATM. She said she would put some of the
money in the ATM but keep some for herself. Ms. Hurles used the
example of (verbatim), "If I cashed a check for $500, I would put $400 or
so into the ATM and then pocket the rest."
(PSI, p.7.) The following dialogue occurred at the first restitution hearing:
Q [defense counsel]: So what I'm saying is, isn't it possible that Ms. Hurles
wasn't cashing all of these checks but, instead, returning a significant
portion back to the bar.
A [Ms. Morrison]: I think that she's already admitted in her PSI that she
would take checks to the bank and cash them, and a portion of that
proceeds would go into the ATM. So I think that's pretty clear.

(05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.)

At the original restitution hearing, various problems were identified in the
spreadsheet created by Ms. Berriochoa, including but not limited to, the fact that the
spreadsheet did not consider that Ms. Hurles only took a small percentage of the
proceeds of the checks she cashed.

This problem was never resolved and the current

restitution award includes the full amount of the cashed checks, even though there is
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absolutely no evidence that Ms. Hurles stole the full amount. The following dialogue
occurred at that hearing:
Q [Defense Counsel]:
It looks to me like what U1is spreadsheet is ...
essentially, you've complied or you've just cataloged these checks; is that
right?

A [Ms. Berriochoa]: Yes.
Q [Defense Counsel]:
And your testimony here today doesn't have
anything to do with that happened to the money with these checks; is that
right?

A [Ms. Berriochoa]: Correct.
(05/19/11 Tr., p.34, Ls. 7-14.)

Ms. Berriochoa also testified that, on one page of the seventy-three page
spreadsheet, she attributed four checks endorsed by Mr. Morrison to Ms. Hurles.
(05/19/11 Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.12.) Defense counsel asked Ms. Berriochoa if she
"miscategorized those checks" and she said, "I have." (05/19/11 Tr., p.35, Ls.13-15.)
Trial counsel then said, "to be honest with you, as I went through your record keeping, I
saw a lot of miscategorizations." (05/19/11 Tr. p.25, Ls.16-19.) Trial counsel then said
"I saw we have got two full binders of checks over there. And I saw a lot of them signed

by Jody Morrison, I saw a lot of them signed by the Morrisons, but they made it into this
[column] 4." 6 (05/19/11 Tr., p.36, Ls.1-6.) Ms. Berriochoa also testified that she has no
accounting background, she only had a small degree of familiarization with the

Morrisons' bookkeeping procedures, she had no idea what happened to any of the
Ms. Berriochoa testified that the spread sheet had thirteen columns and she added up
all of the totals from columns four, five, eight, and eleven and that total, $153,920, was
the basis for the State's restitution calculation. (05/19/1·1 Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.32, L.17.)
The State attributed all of these checks to Ms. Hurles' restitution figure because they
were supposed to be ones endorsed by Ms. Hurles. (05/19/11 Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.33,
L.18.)
6
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checks after they were cashed, and she had no idea who cashed $1 '14,000 of the
checks. (05/19/11 Tr., p.33, L.23 - p.36, L.25.)
Ms. Morrison also testified that some of the checks Ms. Berriochoa accidentally

included in Ms. Hurles' restitution figure were in fact cashed by the Morrisons.
(05/19/11 Tr., p.50, L.18 - p.51, L.20.) Some of the checks had the initials W.8. and
D.B., and Ms. Morrison could not identify those people. (05/19/11 Tr., p.60, L.12 - p.61,
L.14.)
At the final restitution/sentencing hearing, defense counsel rnade the following
argument about the amount of restitution:
In terms of what the actual figure was, I requested tax records. Tax
records, they opposed on obtaining tax records. And if you take a look at
this spreadsheet that's given -- I know we are not talking about restitution .
. . [at this point in the hearing], but I think I need to make a record of it -- it
really has no value whatsoever in an accounting. All you really have in that
column on the spreadsheet is just a log of checks. We don't have what
their profits were, we don't know what their losses were. We don't know if
they are claiming losses on these things. I know they say that are claiming
losses. I don't know that information, and my job my circle of responsibility
here for Ms. Hurles is to figure out what were the profits, what were the
losses. All I have is a window of checks that were cashed.

If I could from my understanding -- this is basically how Ms. Hurles
was stealing money. She would take these checks; this money was
supposed to go into the ATM machine. By their account -- this is why I
personally struggle with this particular case -- by their account, if we take
that restitution figure, that means that every single check that she cashed
she took for herself. By logical extension, what that means is that [the]
ATM would never have any money in it. She would literally take every
single penny that was supposed to go into the ATM.
Ms. Hurles says what she would do was, she would go cash these
checks. She would get ... $1,500. She would keep [$200 to $300] for
herself and she would put [$1,200 to $1,300] in the ATM machine. What
we don't have is ... records from the ATM machine.
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And it's very difficult
what was
information.

me to just say there is a figure out there that
from the ATM when we don't have that

Once again, we are bound by the accountant/client privilege, and I
can't pursue that. So it's their choice not to reveal this information.
(08/-11/11 Tr., p.119, L.25 -

1

, L.21.) Defense counsel then stated that twenty to

thirty percent of the restitution requested by the Morrisons matches the $20,000 to
$50,000 amount that Ms. Hurles admitted she stole. (08/11/11 Tr., p.122, L.20 - p.123,
L.1.) The district court then said that "[t]here is an approximate additional $100,000 ...
they believe was taken by her .... "7 (08/11/11 Tr., p.123, Ls.2-5.) Defense counsel
then pointed out that those

are . . . signed by

Morrisons."

(08/11/11

stated:

Tr., p.123,

[She] may wish to file an appeal. I think I need to make a record of this last
issue, and that is, from my perspective and the problem that we have here,
basically, is that the Morrisons were doing the exact same thing. They
were taking money that was supposed to go to the ATM account and they
were cashing these checks. We have checks made out to the ATM that
were signed by [the Morrisons].
(08/11/11 Tr., p.124, Ls.2-10.) The implication is that the Morrisons were requesting
restitution from Ms. Hurles for money they removed from the ATM account and used for
their own purposes.
The restitution amount requested by the Morrisons was not credible, as there
were wild ranges of restitution estimates. Based on Mr. Warr's accounting, the Boise
Police Department concluded that the amount of money taken from the ATM was
$108,500.

(PSI, p.214.)

The Morrisons told the presentence investigator that the

7

The Morrisons agreed to not seek restitution for the $100,000 which was related to
checks they endorsed. (08/11/11 Tr., p.123, L.2- p.124, L.10.)
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amount of restitution they were requesting was $149,220. (PSI, p.6.) The attorney from
Givens Pursley initially concluded that the restitution was $284, 830. (PSI, p.187.)
In sum, there are many problems with the restitution estimates provided by the
Morrisons. The main problem is that Ms. Hurles was only taking ten to twenty percent
of the checks she cashed, but Ms. Berriochoa said she did not take that into
consideration. Additionally, many of the checks were endorsed by the Morrisons, W.B.,
and D.B., but were included in the restitution total anyway.

As argued in Section I,

supra, many of these issues could have been resolved if the Morrisons' accountant,
Mr. Warr, would have testified, but the Morrisons used the accountant-client privilege as
a means to prevent him from clarifying the errors in the restitution total. Since none of
these issues were resolved, the restitution ordered by the district court is not supported
by substantial and competent evidence. 8

2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Restitution For
Checks Which Were Cashed Between 2005 And November Of 2008

Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) permits a court to order restitution for any person who
suffers an economic loss that results from a defendant's criminal activities. State v.

Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011 ). "The statute defines victim as 'a person or entity,
who suffers economic loss or injury as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct."' Id.
(quoting I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i) (original emphasis)). "The term economic loss includes
'the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and
direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the

criminal conduct." Id. (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) (original emphasis)).

8

A causal

The Court of Appeals did not address this issue in the Opinion because it reversed the
restitution award on other bases. (Opinion, p.5 n.6.)
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connection between the defendant's criminal conduct and the injuries suffered by the
victim must exist in order for the district court to order restitution. Id. The question of
causation is one of fact for the district court to decide and the decision of whether to
order restitution is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Id. The district court's
factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal provided they are supported by
substantial evidence. Id.
The Information in this matter charged Ms. Hurles with grand theft for allegedly
stealing money from the ATM at the No Lawyers Bar between December 2008 and
December 2009.

(R., pp.26-27.)

The Information also charged Ms. Hurles with a

second count of grand theft for allegedly stealing approximately $10,000 from the
proceeds of the pull tab lottery game. (R., pp.26-27.) Ms. Hurles agreed to enter a
guilty plea to grand theft for the ATM thefts, and the State dismissed the charge relating
to the pull tab thefts. (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, L.19 - p.3, L.14; R., pp.33-34.) At the change
of plea hearing, the State said it was "going to seek restitution on all DRs that were
disclosed in discovery."

(02/17/11 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.)

Ms. Hurles then admitted to

stealing money from the No Lawyers Bar from December 2008 to December 2009.
(02/17/11 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.3.)

After Ms. Hurles' guilty plea was entered and

accepted by the district court, the State clarified that the restitution amount "will include
the dismissed charge as well." (02/17/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-17.)
At the first restitution hearing, the State was requested restitution for alleged
thefts from the ATM which occurred from 2005 to 2010. (05/19/11 Tr., p.73, L.11 - p.74,
L.6.) At the final restitution/sentencing hearing, Ms. Hurles stated that she only took
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money for fourteen months. (08/11 /11 Tr., p.128, Ls:18-22.) The district court ordered
restitution based on the State's request. (R., pp. 71-72.)
Ms. Hurles argues that I.C. § 19-5304 only allowed the district court to award

restitution for the alleged thefts that occurred from December of 2008 to December of
2009, and any restitution which was based on thefts which occurred outside of that
period should not have been included in the restitution order.

As stated above,

I.C. § 19-5304 requires a causal relationship between the criminal act and the damages
resulting in restitution. Idaho Code Section 19-5304(1 )(b) states that, '"Found guilty of
any crime"' shall mean a finding by a court that a defendant has committed a criminal
act and shall include an entry of a plea of guilty, an order withholding judgment,
suspending sentence, or entry of judgment of conviction for a misdemeanor or felony."
When I.C. § 19-5304(1)(b) is read in light of I.C. § 19-5304('1)(a) and I.C. § 19-5304
(1 )(e)(i), it indicates that the causal relationship must be with the actual crime to which
the defendant was convicted.

That proposition is borne out of the fact I.C. § 19-

5304(1 )(b), defines "found guilty of any crime" to mean the actual crime to which the
defendant pleaded guilty. Since Ms. Hurles pleaded guilty to thefts which occurred from
December 2008 to December 2009, those are the only thefts for which restitution can
be ordered. However, the district court ordered restitution for alleged thefts which were
not charged in the information and to which Ms. Hurles never pleaded guilty. Thus, the
district court's restitution order runs afoul of I.C. § 19-5304 and should be recalculated
to include only the alleged thefts from December of 2008 to December of 2009.
Support for Ms. Hurles position is found in State v. Hargas, 126 Idaho 727, 730
(Ct. App. 1995), where it was held that in the event multiple charges are brought and
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some are dismissed,
for injuries or

an agreement to

restitution

by the dismissed

On review, the State asserts that the plea agreement includes restitution going
back to 2005. (Respondent's Brief On Review, pp.11-18.) There are various reasons
why the State's assertion that Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for uncharged
conduct is problematic. First, the prosecutor indicated an intent to "seek" restitution "on
all DRs that were disclosed in discovery." (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.) The mere fact
that the State was going to seek restitution for certain amounts of money does not mean
that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for those amounts of money.
State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495-498 (Ct. App.

See

12).

More importantly, the foregoing "terms" of the plea agreement are far
ambiguous to be enforceable against Ms. Hurles.

"(\JV]here the language of [a] plea

agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the defendant."
State v. Acuna, 154 Idaho 139, 141 (Ct. App. 2013). "In determining whether a contract

is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain whether the contract is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretations." Id.
The term "DRs" is ambiguous because it is not defined anywhere in the record. It
could be a reference to the dismissed charge. This would be consistent with the State's
comment at the end of the change of plea hearing where the State said that the
restitution amount "will include the dismissed charge as well." (02/17/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.1417.)

It could be a reference to restitution for an unrelated case.

This would be

consistent with the guilty plea advisory form where Ms. Hurles indicated that she had
agreed to pay restitution in another case. (R., p.40.) One could speculate as to various
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meaning of "DRs," as that term is not defined in the record and the State never
attempted to define that term at the change of plea hearing.

Since there are a

multitude of meanings for the phrase "DRs" there is an ambiguity which should be
resolved in Ms. Hurles' favor. Ms. Hurles argues that the most reasonable interpretation
of the term "DRs" is that it is a reference to the dismissed charge.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Ms. Hurles and held that since the State only
said it would "seek" restitution, the "words of the agreement include no expression of
consent by Hurles to pay any amount of restitution or to pay for any specified economic
loss beyond the crime charged." (Opinion, p.11.) 'The words of the agreement only
inform the court of what the State would try to recover; 'It did not relieve the State of its
burden to prove any amount of restitution claimed .... "' (Opinion, p.11 (citing Nienburg
153 Idaho at 814-815).)
The Court of Appeals also held that even if it "were to stretch the plea agreement
to include consent, the plain language of the plea agreement does not express what
Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for." (Opinion, p.11.) It further reasoned that the
record does not indicate what "DRs" mean and "if 'DRs' refer to some time period
outside of the time period charged."

(Opinion, p.11.) The Court then held that the

ambiguity must be interpreted in Ms. Hurles' favor. 9 (Opinion, pp.11-12.)

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that at the final restitution/sentencing hearing,
the district court summarized the plea agreement and said that Ms. Hurles was paying
restitution for "all incidences, not simply the one grand theft charge, but the entire time
that you were working for the employer and any thefts that may have occurred," and
Ms. Hurles said that was her understanding of the prior proceedings. (Opinion, p.12.)
The Court of Appeals then held:
9

We are not convinced that Hurles' statement to the court is consent
to pay restitution.
Instead, the statement merely offers Hurles'
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a final

Hu

consistently stated

until her husband lost his job in
.) More importantly,

she did not

(PSI, pp.6-7., 08/11/11 Tr., p.1

1

Morrison primarily based her belief that Ms. Hurles began

stealing in 2004 on nothing more than admitted speculation. Specifically, Ms. Morrison
told the presentence investigator "her theft over the last 6 years (we have to assume it
has been going on her whole length of employment in one way or another) .... " (PSI,
p.5.) Even though the No Lawyers Bar had accounting discrepancies that went back to
2004, many of those could be explained by the fact that the Morrisons might have been
taking money out of the ATM in the same manner as Ms. Hurles. (08/11/11 Tr., p.1
0.) This position is further supported by the fact that the Morrisons were willing to
forgo approximately $100,000 of their original restitution estimate after defense counsel
pointed out that the Morrisons were the ones who endorsed those checks. (08/11 /11
Tr., p.122, L.10- p.124, L.10.) As argued in Section I, supra, this could have been
cleared up had the Morrisons allowed their accountant, Mr. Warr, to testify as to his
restitution estimate.

acquiescence to the court's description of what had happened in the prior
proceedings. Moreover, a defendant's acquiescence to a district court's
error in recalling what the plea agreement was does not pollute the waters
upstream. As we recognized in Nienburg, the district court's error
applying the restitution statute or recalling the restitution terms does not
obliterate the plea agreement that the defendant and the State agreed to,
nor is the State's burden changed. What is more, if we accept the State's
contention, it would be quite perplexing for a district court to announce that
it is ordering restitution and then seek consent when section 19-5304(9)
mandates the court to first have "consent of the parties" in order to award
restitution outside of section 19-5304(2).
(Opinion, p.12 (original emphasis).)
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In sum, I.C § 19-5304 requires that there be a causal relationship between the
charged offense and the injuries suffered by the victim in order for restitution to be
awarded to cover the cost of those injuries.

In this case, the district court ordered

restitution for uncharged conduct in contravention of I .C. § 19-5304. As such, a new
restitution hearing should be ordered in order for restitution to be calculated in
compliance with I.C. § 19-5304.

3.

The Fundamental Error Standard Is Not Applicable To Ms. Hurles' Claim
Of Error

In its Respondent's Brief on Review, the State argues, for the first time in this
appeal, that Ms. Hurles' claim that she did not agree to pay restitution for uncharged
conduct was not preserved below and, therefore, is subject to the fundamental error test
adopted by this Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). (Respondent's Brief On
Review, pp.17-18.) In order to make a showing of fundamental error, the defendant
must demonstrate: (1) the error was of constitutional magnitude - i.e. one or more of
the defendant's un-waived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error was plain on
the face of the record and that the failure to object was not the product of a tactical
decision; and (3) the error was prejudicial, which requires the defendant to show a
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the outcome of the proceedings. Id.
at 226.
Ms. Hurles argues that this standard is not applicable to her restitution claims
because she is merely arguing that there is no causal relationship between the actual
charge to which she pleaded guilty and the alleged injuries the victims sustained
between 2005 and November 2008. There is no difference between this argument and
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arguing that a district court's factual findings are not supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Ms. Hurles is not aware of any authority requiring a defendant to
object to a factual finding made by a district court in order to challenge that finding on
appeal. In other words, the district court's order requiring Ms. Hurles to pay restitution
outside of the charged time period is an adverse ruling which she can challenge on
appeal, absent an objection. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397 (2003) ("To
properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court
below or the issue must have been raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.").
Ms. Hurles' claim of error is not subject to the fundamental error standard
because the district court's restitution award constitutes a factual finding which is an
adverse ruling.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Civil Attorneys' Fees As Part
Of The Restitution Awarded In The Criminal Proceedings

A.

Introduction
The Morrisons, owners of the No Lawyers Bar, hired a civil law firm, Givens

Pursley, to litigate issues tangentially related to Ms. Hurles' embezzlement. It appears
that the Morrisons sued their accountant, Mr. Warr, Mr. Warr's firm, and U.S. Bank, and
intervened in Ms. Hurles' Bankruptcy. (PSI, p.52; Opinion, p.13.) Additionally, Givens
Pursley helped the Morrisons prepare for the criminal restitution hearing in this case and
billed $14,876.73 for its efforts. (PSI, p.52.) Givens Pursley's total bill for all this ligation
was $48,734.61, which was included in the restitution award over Ms. Hurles'
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objection. 10 Ms. Hurles argues that the district Court erred when it included the civil
attorneys' fees in the restitution order, as civil attorneys' fees have been characterized
as non-economic damages which are not awardable pursuant to Idaho's criminal
restitution statute l.C. §19-5304.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Civil Attorneys' Fees
As Part Of The Restitution Awarded In The Criminal Proceedings
As a preliminary note, the applicable standards of review has been articulated in

Sections 11(8)(1) and 11(8)(2), supra, and are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
Idaho Code Section 19-5304(11 ), states that "[a]n order of restitution shall not
preclude the victim from seeking any other legal remedy."

However, "[o]ne of the

purposes of restitution is to obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and
inconvenience of a separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their losses."
State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78 (Ct. App. 2010). Additionally, l.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a)
"disallows restitution for noneconomic damages that might be available in a civil lawsuit,
such as pain and suffering, wrongful death, emotional distress, and the like." Id.
The issue of the availability for civil attorneys' fees under I.C. § 19-5304 was
addressed in State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165 (Ct. App. 2006).

In that case, the

defendant, Ms. Parker, was working as a bookkeeper for the victims and cashed
approximately $18,000 of unauthorized checks. Id. at 166. Ms. Parker was charged
with ten counts of forgery and, in addition, the victim filed a civil action against
Ms. Parker and others. Id. Ms. Parker then pleaded guilty to one count of forgery and

10

The district court entered a restitution order separately listing the amounts of
restitution for the stolen money and the attorneys' fees. (R., pp.71-72.)
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the remaining counts were dismissed. Id. The district court then entered a withheld
judgment and placed Ms. Parker on probation.

As a term of her probation,

Id.

Ms. Parker was required to pay restitution for the forged checks and she was required
to pay $16,·133.75 for attorneys' fees the victim incurred in the civil case. Id. at 166·167.

Ms. Parker appealed and argued that the victim's attorneys' fees "were not a

direct economic loss resulting from her criminal conduct, and therefore not appropriate
as restitution or as a condition of probation." Id. at 167.
In resolving this issue, the Court of Appeals first held that I.C. § 19-5304(2) only
allows restitution to be ordered for economic loss.

Id.

The Court then held that a

victimized business could recover, as restitution, salaries it paid its employees "for
investigating the extent of the defendant's theft." Id. However, the Court reasoned that
"[i]t does not follow, however, that restitution rnay be ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304
for any out-of-pocket expense that the victim would not have incurred but for the
defendant's crime." Id. (original emphasis). In fact, the Court had previously held that in
some instances the expense of preventing future harm "was not compensable through a
restitution order ... [as] a victim's own assessment of actions necessary to respond to a
crime is not the correct measure for restitution under section 19-5304."

Id. (citing

State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624 (Ct. App. 2004)). The Court of Appeals held as
follows:
With these authorities in mind, we conclude that the principal
question in assessing the restitution award for attorney fees in the present
case is whether the attorney fees for filing the civil lawsuit were an expense
that was necessary in order for the victim to recover the losses caused by
Parker's forgeries. It is apparent that they were not. The only claim alleged
in the civil complaint relating to the forged checks was for the amount of the
forged checks, which is precisely what the victim was clearly entitled to
receive and did receive in the restitution order. The victim's civil complaint
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also claimed damages for overpayment of wages that resulted from Parker
submitting false time sheets, and for conspiracy and unjust enrichment
related to two other defendants. None of these additional damages are
alleged to have resulted from the forgeries. Under these circumstances, the
lawsuit and the associated attorney fees were unnecessary to recover the
victim's direct loss caused by the forgeries, for that loss was entirely
compensable through the restitution order in the criminal case. Any
judgment that the victim might have recovered in the civil litigation for the
forged checks would have been duplicative of the restitution ordered in the
criminal case. Therefore, the attorney fees related to the lawsuit are not an
economic loss compensable through a restitution order under I.C. § 195304(1 )(a).

Id. at 168. The Court of Appeals also addressed a separate issue dealing with the
question of whether the victim's same civil attorney fees could be ordered as a term of
the defendant's probation. Id. The Court of Appeals' holding follows:
[\!V]e conclude that the ordered payment of the victim's attorney fees was
not a permissible condition of probation. As explained above, the victim's
civil action encornpassed several claims that were not based upon the
charged forgeries and also encompassed claims against third persons. It
therefore is not clear whether or to what extent the attorney fees represent
"resulting harm" from the crime to which Parker pleaded guilty. Of equal
importance, the validity of the victim's civil claims against Parker, other than
the claim for the forgery, have not been adjudicated. Parker's guilty plea in
the criminal case did not include an admission of the other alleged
wrongdoing delineated in the victim's civil complaint, and there has been
no judicial determination that Parker bears liability on those claims. It was
premature, therefore, for the trial court to order Parker's payment of
attorney fees incurred by the victim to pursue claims of unknown validity.
The merits of the underlying claims, and of the victim's request for an
award of attorney fees incurred in pursuing those claims, must be
determined in the civil action.

Id. at 168-169.
In this case, Ms. Hurles objected to the inclusion of the attorneys' fees at the
original restitution hearing.

(05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.18-19.) The district court ultimely

ordered Ms. Hurles to pay $48,734.61 for attorneys' fees. (R., pp. 71-72.)
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district court

when it included the civil

Mr. Warr's firm, and U

The nature of

the

its

civil lawsuits in

matter are somewhat unclear, however, the lawsuit against Mr. Warr was based on a
breach of duty he owed as an accountant to the Morrisons. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 p.14, L.5.) The lawsuit against Mr. Warr's firm was probably based on the breach of the
same duty. Under the holdings in Parker, these attorneys' fees are not compensable
because they are not based Ms. Hurles' thefts, but Mr. Warr's alleged breach of his duty
to the Morrisons. Further, it is a lawsuit against a third party which was also a reason to
deny the restitution award in Parker. The basis for the lawsuit against U.S. Bank is
unclear from the record, but at a minimum the attorneys' fees for that lawsuit are not
compensable under the reasoning in Parker because, as with the lawsuit against
Mr. Warr, it is against a third party. Finally, none of these lawsuits were final at the time
of the restitution/sentencing hearings, and that same lack of finality was another reason
why restitution could not be ordered for the civil lawsuits in Parker.

(08/11/11

Tr., p.118, L.24 - p.119, L.5, 125, L.25 - p.126, L.4.) The Court of Appeals agreed with
Ms. Hurles and held that the attorneys' fees for the lawsuits against Mr. Warr,
Mr. Warr's firm, and U.S. Bank were not direct economic losses and, therefore, they
were not awardable as restitution under their holding in Parker and I.C. § 19-5304.
(Opinion, pp.13-14.)
Ms. Hurles also argues that the attorneys' fees associated with the Morrisons'
intervention in her bankruptcy was not compensable because the only logical reason for
the Morrisons to intervene in the Hurles' bankruptcy would be to secure funds from the
bankruptcy estate. The Court of Appeals did not agree with Ms. Hurles and held that
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for the Morrisons' to "protect the right
to recover the

directly caused by the

.

the

[Morrisons') claim against Hurles might have been discharged in bankruptcy." (Opinion,
pp:15-16 (citing In re Dean, 359 B.R. 218,221 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006).)
The Court of Appeals' holding that the Morrisons had to intervene in Ms. Hurles'
bankruptcy to prevent their criminal restitution from being discharged does not comport
with bankruptcy law because restitution ordered in state criminal proceedings is not
dischargeable in federal bankruptcy proceedings.

In Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36

(1986), 11 the United States Supreme Court held that criminal restitution orders are
automatically excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). 12 According to the
10th Circuit, "[e]ven though § 523(a)(7) on its face does not except from discharge a
'fine, penalty, or forfeiture' that is 'compensation for actual pecuniary loss,' which seems
to accurately describe a criminal restitution obligation, the Supreme Court concluded
that in enacting § 523(a)(7) as part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (the 'Code'), Congress
could not have intended to render restitution obligations dischargeable, because it was
well settled in pre-Code case law that restitution was not dischargeable." Williams, 438
B.R. at 688 (citing Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43-47). The Supreme Court held that it would not
interpret 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) to abrogate the federal judiciary's "historical aversion to

11

The case the Court of Appeals relied on did not deal with criminal restitution, as the
debt in that case was an "unsecured loan on personal injury recovery." In re Dean, 359
B.R. at 219. It should be noted that under federal bankruptcy law, "a debt arising from a
criminal sanction is distinct from a debt arising from a contract ... or a debt arising from
a tort .... " Williams v. Meyer, 438 B.R. 679, 687 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010).
12 'The relevant portion of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) provides that a discharge does not
discharge any debt 'to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary
loss."' Williams, 438 B.R. at 686-687 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)).
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,
'

altering state criminal sentences in bankruptcy" absent an express provision intending
such an outcome. Id. According to the United States Supreme Court:
Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis for this
judicial exception, a deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should
not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings. The right to
formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important aspect of the
sovereignty retained by the States. This Court has emphasized repeatedly
"the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal
prosecutions."
Kelly, 479 U.S. 4 7 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971 )).

It should also be noted that the federal courts have rejected the notion that
dischargeability of criminal restitution can vary depending on an individual state's
restitution scheme. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a debtor's
argument, in reliance on the Kelly Opinion, that criminal restitution can be discharged in
the State of Washington because the purpose of restitution in that State is to benefit the
victim as opposed to benefit the State. Steiger v. Washington, 159 B.R. 907, 910-911
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit also rejected the argument that restitution is
dischargeable in Washington because it can be ordered as a term of probation and is,
therefore, not part of the criminal sentence. Id. at 911-912. In light of the Ninth Circuit's
broad reading of Kelly, Idaho's individualized restitution scheme is not a basis for
holding that criminal restitution ordered in Idaho is dischargeable in federal bankruptcy
proceedings.
Since criminal restitution is automatically excepted from discharge in bankruptcy
proceedings, the Morrisons had no reason to intervene in Ms. Hurles' bankruptcy.
Therefore, the district court erred when it awarded attorneys' fees for the intervention in
Ms. Hurles' bankruptcy and the Court of Appeals erred when it determined that it was
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necessary for the Morrisons to intervene in the Hurles' bankruptcy in order to prevent
the criminal restitution from being discharged.
Ms. Hurles also argues that the award of civil attorneys' fees in the amount
$14,876.73 for a paralegal to create a spreadsheet constitutes an abuse of discretion,
as those fees are unreasonable. It is hard to fathom how Givens Pursley accumulated
$14,876.73 in fees to create a spreadsheet, especially since Mr. Warr, a certified public
accountant, had already conducted a professional accounting of the Morrisons' losses.
(PSI, pp.3, 213-214.)

The work appears somewhat duplicative, as Mr. Warr's work

product was used in the presentence investigation and, as argued in Section I, supra,
was heavily relied on to establish the Morrisons' restitution estimate.

(PSI, p.3.)

Moreover, this work should have been performed by an accountant, as the $14,876.73
spreadsheet was replete with errors and only caused confusion. 13 See Section ll(B)(1 ),
supra. In fact, Givens Pursley estimated that the amount of restitution was $284,839

(PSI, p.188), and that estimate was so unreliable the restitution ultimately ordered was
$155,440. (R., pp.71-72.) When Ms. Morrisons was asked at the restitution hearing if
she could account for the fact that Ms. Hurles was only taking a portion of the
proceedings of the cashed check, Ms. Morrison relied on Mr. Warr's accounting, not
Ms. Berriochoa's spreadsheet. (05/11/19 Tr., p.71, L.8 - p.73, L.10.)

When Mr. Warr

reviewed the spreadsheet with trial counsel he concluded that "a lot of that information

Ms. Berriochoa, the paralegal that created the spreadsheet, testified that she has no
accounting background, she only had a small degree of familiarization with the
Morrisons' bookkeeping procedures, she miscategorized some of the checks in the
spreadsheet, she had no idea what happened to any of the checks' proceeds after they
were cashed, and she had no idea who cashed $114,000 of the checks. (05/19/11
Tr., p.24, L.16 - p.26, L.22, p.33, L.23 - p.36, L.25.)
13
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is incorrect." (05/19/11 Tr., p.80, L.13 - p.81, L.2.) As such, the district court abused its
discretion when it ordered unreasonable attorneys' fees because the spreadsheet was
an unreliable duplication of Mr. Warr's prior accounting of the amount of losses from the
ATM.
Ms. Hurles recognizes that the Court of Appeals held that the attorneys' fees for
preparation for the restitution hearing were necessary and, therefore, awardable under
I.C. § 19-5304. (Opinion, p.16.) However, Ms. Hurles stands by her contention that
they are unreasonable.
In the event this Court grants relief based on the argument set forth in Section
11(8)(2), supra, Ms. Hurles also argues that the $14,876.73 figure should be recalculated
to exclude time billed for cataloguing checks falling outside of the December 2008 to
December 2009 time period, as restitution based on that work is not causally related to
the actions for which Ms. Hurles was convicted.

Again, the Court of Appeals also

agreed with this argument and held that the fees should be adjusted and only include
the time frame between December 2008 to December 2009. (Opinion, p.16.)
In sum, the attorneys' fees for the third party lawsuits are not compensable
economic damages under I.C. § 19-5304 and the Parker holding because those
lawsuits were

against third

parties

and

were

not final

at the

time of the

restitution/sentencing hearing. Additionally, the lawsuit against Mr. Warr was based on
an alleged breach of a duty he owed to the Morrisons and were, therefore, not based on
the Ms. Hurles' charged thefts.

It was also unnecessary for the Morrisons to intervene

in the Hurles' bankruptcy as criminal restitution is automatically excepted from
discharge in federal bankruptcy proceedings.
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As such, the district court abused its

discretion when it ordered civil attorneys' fees as part of the criminal restitution because
that decision did not comport with the applicable legal standards.

Additionally, the

district court abused its discretion when it ordered civil attorneys' fees for the work
performed in preparation of the restitution hearing as that work was unreliable,
duplicative, and therefore, unreasonable.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Hurles respectfully requests that this case be remanded for another
restitution hearing with instructions that the district court allow Mr. \Narr to testify and
that restitution only be ordered for the thefts which occurred from December 2008 to
December of 2009. Ms. Hurles also requests an instruction consistent with this Court's
rulings on the issues relating to the civil attorneys' fees.

In the event this Court

determines that the Morrisons did not waive the accountant-client privilege, or any other
claim of error is deemed meritless, Ms. Hurles alternatively requests that this case be
remanded for new restitution hearing with applicable instructions as to any of
Ms. Hurles' prevailing claims of error.
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2014.

SHAWN F. WIL..KERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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